What is the story so far?
The DMK has revived the paper ballot debate. At a meeting of its MPs in Chennai on October 17, chaired by party president M.K. Stalin, it adopted four resolutions, including a demand to replace EVMs with paper ballots and a decision to petition President Droupadi Murmu. The party linked the demand to its opposition to the Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls and its criticism of the Election Commission. EVMs have been the norm in all Lok Sabha polls since 2004. However, neither the Constitution nor the Representation of the People Act, 1951, makes their use compulsory. The real question is whether India can return to paper ballots and, if so, whether Parliament or the Election Commission has the legal authority to decide.
Why did India need a law before it could use EVMs?
India’s first major legal battle over EVMs arose during the 1982 Assembly election in Parur, Kerala, where the Election Commission used the machines at 50 polling stations. A.C. Jose, a Congress candidate, lost to CPI candidate Sivan Pillai by 123 votes and challenged the result on the ground that the law then in force did not permit EVMs. Of Sivan Pillai’s 30,450 votes, 19,182 were cast using the machines. In A.C. Jose v. Sivan Pillai (1984), the Supreme Court did not find the machines unreliable. It held that the Election Commission could not rely on Article 324, which grants it broad control over elections, to introduce a voting method not authorised by the existing Act and Rules. The Court said its powers were intended to “supplement rather than supplant the law”. It set aside polling at the 50 EVM booths and ordered a fresh vote there. Parliament subsequently supplied the missing legal basis by inserting Section 61A into the Representation of the People Act, 1951, through the 1988 amendment, which came into force in 1989.
Does election law require EVMs or merely permit them?
The law permits EVMs; it does not make them compulsory. Section 59 of the Act lays down the ordinary rule that votes are to be given “by ballot” in the prescribed manner. Section 61A creates an exception, stating that voting machines “may be adopted” in constituencies specified by the Election Commission, notwithstanding anything in the Act or Rules. That wording matters. Parliament did not replace ballot voting with a mandatory electronic system; it gave the Commission legal authority to use machines where it chooses to do so. The Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961, retain provisions for ballot papers and ballot boxes alongside those governing electronic voting. A return to paper ballots is therefore not, on the face of the Act, legally prohibited. The harder question is whether the Election Commission could stop specifying constituencies for EVM use under Section 61A and revert nationwide to the existing ballot provisions. The statute appears to leave room for that argument.
Who can actually make the switch?
No single institution can act alone. Under Section 61A, the Election Commission determines where EVMs are used. After consulting the Commission, the Union government frames the detailed Conduct of Elections Rules under Section 169. Parliament can amend the Representation of the People Act itself. If Parliament wished to eliminate EVMs entirely or expressly require paper ballots, a constitutional amendment would not be necessary. The 1951 Act is an ordinary statute. Any amendment would follow the usual legislative process, requiring a majority of members present and voting in each House, followed by presidential assent.
Can a state choose paper ballots for its Assembly election?
Not on its own. Article 327 empowers Parliament to legislate on elections to Parliament and state legislatures. Article 328 allows a state legislature to legislate only where Parliament has not already made provision. Since the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and the rules under it already govern Assembly elections, a state has little room to change the voting method for its own Assembly polls. Local body elections are different. Panchayat and municipal polls are conducted by State Election Commissions under Articles 243K and 243ZA, with procedures largely determined by state law. States therefore have much greater freedom to choose between paper ballots and EVMs for local elections.
How is a VVPAT slip different from a paper ballot?
A VVPAT slip is a paper record of a vote cast electronically. The voter presses a button on the EVM; the slip is displayed briefly before falling into a sealed box. Unlike a ballot paper, the voter neither marks nor deposits it. The Supreme Court has treated the paper trail as a safeguard alongside EVMs. In Subramanian Swamy v. Election Commission (2013), it called VVPAT an “indispensable requirement of free and fair elections” and directed its phased introduction. In N Chandrababu Naidu v. Union of India (2019), it increased mandatory VVPAT verification from one randomly selected polling station to five per Assembly constituency or segment. In Association for Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission (2024), the Supreme Court rejected demands for paper ballots and 100 per cent VVPAT counting. However, it allowed candidates finishing second or third to seek verification of up to 5 per cent of EVMs in an Assembly constituency or segment. Requests must be made within seven days of the result, with the candidate identifying the machines, and verification must be carried out by the manufacturers’ engineers. The Court also ordered Symbol Loading Units to be preserved for 45 days. In a May 2025 order in the same matter, it further required data from selected EVMs to be recorded before any erasure during verification, strengthening the checking process without altering the EVM–VVPAT system.
What would returning to paper actually involve?
Although a legal route may exist, the administrative transition would be substantial. The 2024 Lok Sabha election involved nearly 97.98 crore electors and more than 10.5 lakh polling stations. Returning to paper ballots would require printing constituency-specific ballots at that scale, transporting and securing more ballot boxes, expanding and staffing counting centres, and reinstating procedures to determine the validity of doubtful or incorrectly marked votes. In 2024, while considering the EVM–VVPAT system, the Supreme Court noted that EVMs eliminate invalid votes caused by faulty marking and limit the speed at which votes can be cast, making large-scale ballot stuffing harder. Supporters of paper voting make a different case. Their concern is that the primary record of the vote should itself be physically visible, preserved and capable of a manual recount. The choice, therefore, is not merely between older and newer technology. It is between two approaches to building confidence in elections: one based on controlled electronic procedures and the other on a physical record that can be counted directly.
What have other democracies done?
There is no single democratic model for voting machines. Germany used electronic machines in its 2005 federal election. In 2009, its Federal Constitutional Court held that the essential steps of voting and counting must be verifiable by citizens “without any specialist knowledge”. It did not ban electronic voting; it objected to a system that ordinary voters could not independently scrutinise. The Netherlands used about 9,000 machines across 411 municipalities in its 2007 provincial elections. Subsequent reviews raised concerns about security, certification and transparency, including whether electromagnetic emissions could reveal votes. The government withdrew the machines’ regulatory approval that year and returned to paper voting. Brazil took the opposite route. Electronic voting began in 1996, covered the entire electorate by 2000 and remains standard. About 571,000 machines served more than 155 million electors in the 2024 municipal elections.
What are the EC and its critics actually arguing?
The Commission argues that Indian EVMs are standalone machines, candidates and their representatives participate in checks at several stages, and VVPAT provides a physical audit trail. At the press conference on January 7, 2025, announcing the Delhi Assembly election schedule, Chief Election Commissioner Rajiv Kumar said that slips from 67,750 randomly selected VVPATs, covering more than 4.5 crore votes, had been matched with the corresponding electronic counts across elections over the years. No case had been found in which a vote intended for one candidate was transferred to another, he said. The Commission continues to cite the same cumulative figure in its EVM FAQs. Critics raise a different issue. Their argument is not limited to proving manipulation in a particular election; it concerns whether voters and candidates can independently verify the final count. That is why the dispute has increasingly centred on the extent of VVPAT verification, rather than only on allegations that EVMs can be hacked.
Could political consensus change the voting system?
Political consensus could drive change, but cannot alter the voting system by itself. Even agreement among all major parties would not directly amend Section 61A, change the Conduct of Elections Rules or legally compel the Election Commission to abandon EVMs. Any change would still have to follow the route recognised by law: a decision by the Commission under Section 61A, changes to the Rules or fresh legislation by Parliament. That is also the enduring significance of A.C. Jose v. Sivan Pillai. The Supreme Court did not hold that EVMs were undesirable; it held that the Election Commission could not introduce a new voting method without legal authority. Parliament subsequently provided that authority through Section 61A. The principle applies in both directions: India may return to paper ballots, but political agreement alone cannot replace the legal authority required to effect that change.
(Deepika Sethia is a researcher at the Speaker’s Office in the Delhi Legislative Assembly. She writes on Indian politics, governance, law and public institutions)
